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The Stationary Equilibrium of Three-Person Cooperative Games: A Classification

Title	The Stationary Equilibrium of Three-Person Cooperative Games: A Classification
Creator	Creator Name Okada, Akira Okada, Akira 岡田, 章岡田, 章 Affiliation Affiliation Name Hitotsubashi University
Key Word	cooperative game
	noncooperative bargaining
	three-person game
	random proposer
	core
	marginal contribution
JEL	C71
	C72
	C78
Abstract (distribution restricted)	We present a classification of all stationary subgame perfect equilibria of the random proposer model for a three-person cooperative game according to the level of efficiency. The efficiency level is characterized by the number of "central" players who join all equilibrium coalitions. The existence of a central player guarantees asymptotic efficiency. The marginal contributions of players to the grand coalition play a critical role in their expected equilibrium payoffs.
Publisher	Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date	2012-10
Language	English(eng)
Resource Type	technical report
Version Type	VoR
Is Part OfRelation -	Related Title Discussion papers ; No. 2012-06
Number of Pages	23
Appears in Collections	Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL	https://hdl.handle.net/10086/23256