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Evolution of Fairness and Group Formation in Multi-Player Ultimatum Games

Title	Evolution of Fairness and Group Formation in Multi-Player Ultimatum Games
Creator	Creator Name NISHIMURA, Takeshi NISHIMURA, Takeshi 西村, 健西村, 健 Affiliation Affiliation Name Komazawa University
	Creator Name OKADA, Akira OKADA, Akira 岡田, 章岡田, 章 Affiliation Affiliation Name Hitotsubashi University
	Creator Name SHIRATA, Yasuhiro SHIRATA, Yasuhiro 白田, 康洋白田, 康洋 Affiliation Affiliation Name Otaru University of Commerce
Abstract (distribution restricted)	Group formation is a fundamental activity in human society. Humans often exclude others from a group and divide the group benefit in a fair way only among group members. Such an allocation is called in-group fair. Does natural selection favor an in-group fair allocation? We investigate the evolution of fairness and group formation in a three-person Ultimatum Game (UG) in which the group value depends on its size. In a stochastic model of the frequency-dependent Moran process, natural selection favors the formation of a two-person subgroup in the low mutation limit if its group value exceeds a high proportion (0.7) of that of the largest group. Stochastic evolutionary game theory provides theoretical support to explain the behavior of human subjects in economic experiments of a three-person UG.
Publisher	Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Issued Date	2015-08
Language	English(eng)
Resource Type	technical report
Version Type	VoR
Is Part OfRelation -	Related Title Discussion papers ; No. 2015-06
Number of Pages	42
Appears in Collections	Discussion papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
URL	https://hdl.handle.net/10086/27395