Persons, Identity, and Political Theory : A Defense of Rawlsian Political Identity / by Catherine Galko Campbell
| Publisher | (Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer) |
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| Year | 2014 |
| Edition | 1st ed. 2014. |
| Authors | *Campbell, Catherine Galko author SpringerLink (Online service) |
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| Links to the text | Location | Volume | Call No. | Barcode No. | Status | Comments | ISBN | Printed | Restriction | Reserve |
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| Links to the text | Library Off-campus access |
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OB00167630 | Springer Humanities, Social Sciences and Law eBooks (電子ブック) | 9789400779174 |
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| Material Type | E-Book |
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| Media type | 機械可読データファイル |
| Size | XI, 187 p : online resource |
| Notes | Dedication -- Acknowledgments -- Table of Contents -- Chapter 1: Political Identity, Perfectionism and Neutrality -- Chapter 2: Personal Identity and Liberal Political Theory -- Chapter 3: Clarification of the Liberal/Communitarian Debate and Metaphysical Objections to Rawls’s Conception of the Person.- Chapter 4: Taylor’s Conception of Persons and His Theory of Personal Identity.- Chapter 5: Defense of the Original Position.- Chapter 6: Objections to Rawls’s Political Conception of Persons -- Chapter 7: Defense of Rawls’s Political Conception of the Person.- Chapter 8: Rawlsian Political Identity -- Index This book examines the conception of the person at work in John Rawls’s writings from Theory of Justice to Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. The book aims to show that objections to Rawls’s political conception of the person fail and that a Rawlsian conception of political identity is defensible. The book shows that the debate between liberals and communitarians is relevant to the current debate regarding perfectionism and neutrality in politics, and clarifies the debate between Rawls and communitarians in a way that will promote fruitful discussion on the issue of political identity. It does this by providing a clearer account of a conception of personal identity according to which persons are socially constituted, including the intuitions and assumptions underlying the communitarians’ conception of persons as “socially constituted.” It examines the communitarian objections to liberal political theory and to the liberal conception of persons, the “unencumbered self.” The book differentiates between two types of objection to the liberal conception of persons: the metaphysical and normative. It explains Rawls's political conception of persons, and the metaphysical and normative commitments Rawls incurs—and does not incur—in virtue of that conception. It shows that both kind of objection to Rawls's political conception of the person fail. Finally, modifying Rawls’s political conception of the person, a Rawlsian conception of political identity is explained and defended. HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7917-4 |
| Subjects | LCSH:Political science—Philosophy LCSH:Political science LCSH:Law—Philosophy LCSH:Law—History LCSH:Ethics FREE:Political Philosophy FREE:Political Theory FREE:Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History FREE:Moral Philosophy and Applied Ethics |
| Classification | LCC:B65 DC23:320.01 |
| ID | 8000012670 |
| ISBN | 9789400779174 |
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