The Political Economy of International Agreements : A Collection of Essays / edited by Florian Kiesow Cortez
(International Law and Economics. ISSN:2364186X)
Publisher | (Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer) |
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Year | 2021 |
Edition | 1st ed. 2021. |
Authors | Kiesow Cortez, Florian editor SpringerLink (Online service) |
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Links to the text | Location | Volume | Call No. | Barcode No. | Status | Comments | ISBN | Printed | Restriction | Reserve |
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Links to the text | Library Off-campus access |
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OB00174997 | Springer Economics and Finance eBooks (電子ブック) | 9783030851941 |
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Material Type | E-Book |
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Media type | 機械可読データファイル |
Size | VII, 122 p. 1 illus : online resource |
Notes | Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Domestic Institutions and the Political Economy of International Agreements: A Survey and Hypotheses -- Chapter 3. Domestic Institutions and the Ratification of International Agreements in a Panel of Democracies -- Chapter 4. Choosing to Be Constrained: Electoral Institutions and the Varieties of International Organizations -- Chapter 5. Enforcing International Deals: The System of International Organizations from a Politics-as-Exchange Perspective This volume analyzes international agreements from a political economy perspective. In four essays, it raises the question of whether domestic institutions help explain if countries join international agreements, and in case they do, what type of international organization they join. The book examines how specific democratic design elements channel and mediate domestic demands directed at politicians, and how under certain circumstances entering international agreements helps politicians navigate these demands to their benefit. The volume also distinguishes between different types of international instruments with a varying expected constraining effect upon member states, and empirically tests if this matters for incentives to join. The volume addresses scholars, students, and practitioners interested in a better understanding of how the shape of domestic institutions affects politicians’ incentives to enter into binding international agreements HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85194-1 |
Subjects | LCSH:Law and economics LCSH:Economics LCSH:Social choice LCSH:Elections LCSH:International trade LCSH:International economic relations FREE:Law and Economics FREE:Public Choice and Political Economy FREE:Electoral Politics FREE:International Trade FREE:Economics of International Organizations |
Classification | LCC:K487.E3 LCC:HB73 DC23:343.07 DC23:338.9 |
ID | 8000077448 |
ISBN | 9783030851941 |
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