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Auction theory / Vijay Krishna

Publisher	San Diego : Academic Press
Year	©2002
Authors	*Krishna, Vijay

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Links to the text	Location	Volume	Call No.	Barcode No.	Status	Comments	ISBN	Printed	Restriction	Reserve
Links to the text	Library Off-campus access			OB00177580		ScienceDirect (電子ブック)	9780124262973

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Material Type	E-Book
Media type	機械可読データファイル
Size	1 online resource (xi, 303 pages) : illustrations
Notes	Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory Private Value Auctions; The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Qualifications and Extensions; Mechanism Design; Auctions with Interdependent Values; The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle; Asymmetries and Other Complications; Efficiency and the English Auction; Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Bidding Rings; An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions; Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Some Revenue Considerations; Sequential Sales; Nonidentical Objects; Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Appendices: Continuous Distributions' Stochastic Orders; Order Statistics; Affiliated Random Variables; Some Linear Algebra; Games of Incomplete Information; Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions Includes bibliographical references (pages 289-297) and index Print version record Elsevier ScienceDirect All Books HTTP:URL=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780124262973
Subjects	LCSH:Auctions -- Mathematical models All Subject Search LCSH:Game theory MESH:Game Theory CSHF:Vente aux enchères -- Modèles mathématiques All Subject Search CSHF:Théorie des jeux FREE:MATHEMATICS -- Game Theory All Subject Search FREE:Auctions -- Mathematical models All Subject Search FREE:Game theory FREE:Speltheorie FREE:Veilingen FREE:Leilão (modelos matemáticos) FREE:Teoria dos jogos LCSH:Electronic books FREE:Electronic books FREE:Electronic books
Classification	LCC:HF5476 DC22:519.3
ID	8000079688
ISBN	9780124262973