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Mind in Action : Experience and Embodied Cognition in Pragmatism / by Pentti Määttänen
(Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics. ISSN:21926263 ; 18)

Publisher	(Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer)
Year	2015
Edition	1st ed. 2015.
Authors	*Määttänen, Pentti author SpringerLink (Online service)

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Links to the text	Location	Volume	Call No.	Barcode No.	Status	Comments	ISBN	Printed	Restriction	Reserve
Links to the text	Library Off-campus access			OB00169167		Springer Humanities, Social Sciences and Law eBooks (電子ブック)	9783319176239

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Material Type	E-Book
Media type	機械可読データファイル
Size	XII, 94 p. 1 illus : online resource
Notes	Introduction: Challenging Classical Dichotomies -- Philosophical Naturalism -- Experience and the Object of Knowledge -- Habit of Action -- Habits as Meanings -- Mind and Interaction -- Facts and Values in Pragmatism -- Mind in Action and the Problem of Realism The book questions two key dichotomies: that of the apparent and real, and that of the internal and external. This leads to revised notions of the structure of experience and the object of knowledge. Our world is experienced as possibilities of action, and to know is to know what to do. A further consequence is that the mind is best considered as a property of organisms’ interactions with their environment. The unit of analysis is the loop of action and perception, and the central concept is the notion of habit of action, which provides the embodied basis of cognition as the anticipation of action. This holds for non-linguistic tacit meanings as well as for linguistic meanings. Habit of action is a teleological notion and thus opens a possibility for defining intentionality and normativity in terms of the soft naturalism adopted in the book. The mind is embodied, and this embodiment determines our physical perspective on the world. Our sensory organs and other instruments give us instrumental access to the world, and this access is epistemic in character. The distinction between the physical and conceptual viewpoint allows us to define truth as the correspondence with operational fit. This embodied epistemic truth is however not a sign of antirealism, as the instrumentally accessed theoretical objects are precisely those objects that experimental science deals with. HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17623-9
Subjects	LCSH:Knowledge, Theory of LCSH:Artificial intelligence LCSH:Cognitive psychology LCSH:Science—Philosophy FREE:Epistemology FREE:Artificial Intelligence FREE:Cognitive Psychology FREE:Philosophy of Science
Classification	LCC:BD143-237 DC23:120
ID	8000011767
ISBN	9783319176239