HERMES-Catalog

The Theory of Extensive Form Games / by Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger
(Springer Series in Game Theory, Official Series of the Game Theory Society. ISSN:18685188)

Publisher	(Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer)
Year	2016
Edition	1st ed. 2016.
Authors	*Alós-Ferrer, Carlos author Ritzberger, Klaus author SpringerLink (Online service)

Links to the text	Location	Volume	Call No.	Barcode No.	Status	Comments	ISBN	Printed	Restriction	Reserve
Links to the text	Library Off-campus access			OB00175686		Springer Economics and Finance eBooks (電子ブック)	9783662499443

Material Type	E-Book
Media type	機械可読データファイル
Size	XV, 239 p : online resource
Notes	Introduction -- Game Trees -- Pseudotrees and Order Theory -- Extensive Decision Problems -- Extensive Forms -- Discrete Extensive Forms -- Equilibrium -- A Mathematical Appendix This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3
Subjects	LCSH:Econometrics LCSH:Game theory FREE:Quantitative Economics FREE:Game Theory
Classification	LCC:HB139-141 DC23:330.9
ID	8000059434
ISBN	9783662499443