HERMES-Catalog

Back to Results List

Modest Nonconceptualism : Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content / by Eva Schmidt
(Studies in Brain and Mind. ISSN:2468399X ; 8)

Publisher	(Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer)
Year	2015
Edition	1st ed. 2015.
Authors	*Schmidt, Eva author SpringerLink (Online service)

Hide book details.

Links to the text	Location	Volume	Call No.	Barcode No.	Status	Comments	ISBN	Printed	Restriction	Reserve
Links to the text	Library Off-campus access			OB00168169		Springer Humanities, Social Sciences and Law eBooks (電子ブック)	9783319189024

Hide details.

Material Type	E-Book
Media type	機械可読データファイル
Size	XI, 268 p : online resource
Notes	1 Introduction -- 2 Content, Concepts, Concept Possession -- 3 Nonconceptual Content -- 4 Arguments from Phenomenology -- 5 The Argument from Contradictory Contents -- 6 Arguments from Concept Possession -- 7 The Epistemological Objection -- 8 The Objection from Objectivity -- 9 Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate. The volume starts off with an explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths, then the author goes on to defend participants in the debate over nonconceptual content against the allegation that their failure to distinguish between a state view and a content view of (non)conceptualism leads to fatal problems for their views. Next, she makes a case for nonconceptualism by refining some of the central arguments for the view, such as the arguments from fineness of grain, from contradictory contents, from animal and infant perception, and from concept acquisition. Then, two central objections against nonconceptualism are rebutted in a novel way: the epistemological objection and the objection from objectivity. Modest Nonconceptualism allows for perceptual experiences to involve some conceptual elements. It emphasizes the relevance of concept employment for an understanding of conceptual and nonconceptual mental states and identifies the nonconceptual content of experience with scenario content. It insists on the possibility of genuine content-bearing perceptual experience without concept possession and is thus in line with the Autonomy Thesis. Finally, it includes an account of perceptual justification that relies on the external contents of experience and belief, yet is compatible with epistemological internalism HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18902-4
Subjects	LCSH:Philosophy of mind LCSH:Knowledge, Theory of FREE:Philosophy of Mind FREE:Epistemology
Classification	LCC:BD418-418.84 DC23:128.2
ID	8000011803
ISBN	9783319189024