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Handbook on Approval Voting / edited by Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver
(Studies in Choice and Welfare. ISSN:21978530)

Publisher	(Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer)
Year	2010
Edition	1st ed. 2010.
Authors	Laslier, Jean-François editor Sanver, M. Remzi editor SpringerLink (Online service)

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Links to the text	Location	Volume	Call No.	Barcode No.	Status	Comments	ISBN	Printed	Restriction	Reserve
Links to the text	Library Off-campus access			OB00164668		Springer Business and Economics eBooks (電子ブック)	9783642028397

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Material Type	E-Book
Media type	機械可読データファイル
Size	XVIII, 480 p. 49 illus : online resource
Notes	to the Handbook on Approval Voting -- History of Approval Voting -- Acclamation Voting in Sparta: An Early Use of Approval Voting -- Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting -- Axiomatic Theory -- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences -- Axiomatizations of Approval Voting -- Committees -- Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections -- Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? -- Strategic Voting -- The Basic Approval Voting Game -- Approval Voting in Large Electorates -- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting -- Probabilistic Exercises -- On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives -- Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting -- In Silico Voting Experiments -- Experiments -- Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting -- Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections -- Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment -- Electoral Competition -- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting -- Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections -- Meaning for Individual and Society -- Describing Society Through Approval Data -- Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical works have enhanced our understanding of this method. The behavior of voters in such elections has been observed both in the laboratory and in the field; social choice theorists have analyzed the method from the axiomatic point of view; game theory and computer science have been used to scrutinize various strategic aspects; and political scientists have considered the structure of electoral competition entailed by Approval Voting. This book surveys this large body of knowledge through a collection of contributions written by specialists of the various disciplines involved HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7
Subjects	LCSH:Econometrics LCSH:Finance, Public LCSH:Political science LCSH:Game theory FREE:Quantitative Economics FREE:Public Economics FREE:Political Science FREE:Game Theory
Classification	LCC:HB139-141 DC23:330.9
ID	8000063545
ISBN	9783642028397