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Non-Bayesian Decision Theory : Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action / by Martin Peterson
(Theory and Decision Library A:, Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science. ISSN:23522119 ; 44)

Publisher	(Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer)
Year	2008
Edition	1st ed. 2008.
Authors	*Peterson, Martin author SpringerLink (Online service)

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Links to the text	Location	Volume	Call No.	Barcode No.	Status	Comments	ISBN	Printed	Restriction	Reserve
Links to the text	Library Off-campus access			OB00166193		Springer Humanities, Social Sciences and Law eBooks (電子ブック)	9781402086991

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Material Type	E-Book
Media type	機械可読データファイル
Size	VIII, 170 p : online resource
Notes	Bayesian decision theory -- Choosing what to decide -- Indeterminate preferences -- Utility -- Subjective probability -- Expected utility -- Risk aversion This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. To some extent, the author’s non-Bayesian view gives a modern account of what decision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, Savage, and Jeffrey. The author argues that traditional Bayesian decision theory is unavailing from an action-guiding perspective. For the deliberating Bayesian agent, the output of decision theory is not a set of preferences over alternative acts - these preferences are on the contrary used as input to the theory. Instead, the output is a (set of) utility function(s) that can be used for describing the agent as an expected utility maximizer, which are of limited normative relevance.On the non-Bayesian view articulated by the author, utility and probability are defined in terms of preferences over certain outcomes. These utility and probability functions are then used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, which conform to the principle of maximizing expected utility. It is argued that this approach offers more action guidance HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8699-1
Subjects	LCSH:Science—Philosophy LCSH:Operations research LCSH:Computer science—Mathematics LCSH:Mathematical statistics LCSH:Game theory LCSH:Econometrics FREE:Philosophy of Science FREE:Operations Research and Decision Theory FREE:Probability and Statistics in Computer Science FREE:Game Theory FREE:Quantitative Economics
Classification	LCC:Q174-175.3 LCC:B67 DC23:501
ID	8000065341
ISBN	9781402086991