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Breach of Contract : An Economic Analysis of the Efficient Breach Scenario / by Oliver Hofmann
(International Law and Economics. ISSN:2364186X)

Publisher	(Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer)
Year	2021
Edition	1st ed. 2021.
Authors	*Hofmann, Oliver author SpringerLink (Online service)

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Links to the text	Location	Volume	Call No.	Barcode No.	Status	Comments	ISBN	Printed	Restriction	Reserve
Links to the text	Library Off-campus access			OB00175027		Springer Economics and Finance eBooks (電子ブック)	9783030625252

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Material Type	E-Book
Media type	機械可読データファイル
Size	VII, 268 p. 67 illus., 13 illus. in color : online resource
Notes	Introduction -- Breach or Perform Decision – The Traditional Model of the Efficient Breach -- Distributional Effects and the Original Contract -- The Option to Cover -- Over- and Undercompensation -- Incomplete Information -- Transaction Costs -- Conclusion “Efficient breach” is one of the most discussed topics in the literature of law and economics. What remedy incentivizes the parties of a contract to perform contracts if and only if it is efficient? This book provides a new perception based on an in-depth analysis of the impact the market structure, asymmetry of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, comprehensively. The author compares the two predominant remedies for breach of contract which have been adopted by most jurisdictions and also found access to international conventions like the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CiSG): Specific performance and expectation damages. The book illustrates the complexity such a comparison has under more realistic assumptions. The author shows that no simple answer is possible, but one needs to account for the circumstances. The comparison takes an economic approach to law applying game theory. The game-theoretic models are consistent throughout the entire book which makes it easy for the reader to understand what effects different assumptions about the market structure, the distribution of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, and how they are intertwined HTTP:URL=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62525-2
Subjects	LCSH:Law and economics LCSH:Contracts LCSH:Common law LCSH:Economics—Psychological aspects LCSH:Game theory LCSH:International law LCSH:Trade regulation LCSH:Civil law FREE:Law and Economics FREE:Common Contract Law FREE:Behavioral Economics FREE:Game Theory FREE:International Economic Law, Trade Law FREE:Civil Law
Classification	LCC:K487.E3 LCC:HB73 DC23:343.07 DC23:338.9
ID	8000071685
ISBN	9783030625252